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8 April 1966

THE USE OF THE SHOW OF FORCE IN SUPPORT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

By

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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U.S. Foreign Policy

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SUMMARY

United States policy before and since World War II has involved repeated employment of the nation's armed forces in support of the conduct of that policy. Among these employments has been the show of force.

Before World War II significant powers were relatively free from interference in their employment of armed force in advancement of their national and international programs. The climates of those times induced no appreciable after effects unaccommodatable in the then existing world environment. The power with the means and the will to employ its force could indulge in such endeavors with a large degree of impunity--provided its efforts were successful.

Since World War II, the practice has become a bit more harrowing. Nations are now more careful in their employment of force, perhaps because the stakes are higher, and their actions are more and more subject to world scrutiny.

The purpose of this thesis is to review some uses of shows of force in the past, to relate the use to certain planned shows of force in potential contingencies of the future, and to determine whether the contemplated future usages conform to the lessons of history.

Reference historically to the uses of shows of force reveals that several characteristics or circumstances seem to prevail in those instances in which the show of force has been successful. The most significant of these are that the purpose of conducting the show of force is political, the action portrayed must be credible, and that coordination of political and military effort must occur.

Recent history, as well as public statements at the highest governmental levels, indicates that the show of force remains a potentially potent tool, and that it may well again be resorted to as a manner of employing the armed forces in support of national policies. Recent history also reflects that the basic characteristic of the show of force remains as above outlined.

An examination of numerous United States contingency plans at unified command level indicates these plans to be essentially sound. For the most part their contents reveal a recognition of the political nature of the projected operations; steps are inherent in the actions contemplated to provide for a high level of credibility. The plans are however deficient in varying degrees in that they do

not direct nor provide for a close degree of coordination of military and political effort at the execution level.

This paper concludes that a greater degree of political and military coordination in the conduct of shows of force is required, and that instructions for preparations of future plans for such contingencies should be provided the commanders concerned.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The people of the United States have shown themselves willing to support a wide spectrum of usage of United States armed forces during times of hostilities, and have generally understood the importance of military power to the nation. They have been less interested, however, during times of lesser danger; and with the exception of a sizeable hue and cry at President Theodore Roosevelt's "big stick" formula,¹ have tended to leave the employment of armed forces in peacetime in the hands of the President, along with his other foreign policy responsibilities. Among the techniques traditionally employed in the use of armed forces to support the conduct of foreign policy has been the show of force, and it has been used by other countries as well as by the United States.

This paper will examine some past efforts, both successful and unsuccessful, in the functional area of shows of force, to determine the general circumstances contributing to the success of such an action. These determinants will then be compared to some projected usages of the technique as portrayed in existing United States unified command level contingency plans in order to evaluate the probable success of these efforts in the future.

¹Frank Tannenbaum, The American Tradition in Foreign Policy, p. 5.

The term "show of force" does not have an official definition, although it seems to be generally understood; is used by numerous authors, and in the aforementioned contingency plans. Additionally, some synonymous terms are used by some authors. For example, Synder uses the term "force demonstration,"² and Vagts employs "armed demonstrations"³ and even defines the term as "the state or condition of one government contending by the threat of force."

A more comprehensive definition has been derived by Edgar N. Glotzbach in a thesis prepared at the US Army War College in 1964. This definition is set forth below, and will be employed in this thesis: "The deployment of military forces or use of weapons, short of war, to influence international relations by demonstrating a capability and a willingness to conduct military operations to achieve specified objectives."⁴

²Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, p. 50

³Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy, p. 232.

⁴Edgar N. Glotzbach, Show of Force--an Aid in Crisis Management, p. 9.

CHAPTER 2

AUTHORITY AND POLICY

The President, as the Chief Executive of the United States, has the primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy, subject to certain limitations such as the requirement that treaties executed by the executive be ratified by the Senate, and specific retention to the Congress of the authority to declare war.¹

In the absence of a specific prohibition, the authority of the President to employ the nation's armed forces as an instrument in support of his conduct of foreign relations is considered clear.

Setting aside the issue of authority for employment of armed forces in support of foreign policy, there arises the question of policy as to such use. History records continuing instances of such employment, and insofar as the current administration is concerned, the President has expressed himself on the subject as follows:

Our military forces must be so organized and directed that they can be used in a measured, controlled, and deliberate way as a versatile instrument to support our national policy.²

¹Constitution of the United States, Art. 2.

²Lyndon B. Johnson, Message to Congress on the State of Defenses, 18 Jan. 1965, House Document No. 285, 89th Congress, 1st Session, p. 18.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY

Until the advent of modern communications and worldwide acceptance and awareness of the rights of states, the realities of existing power permitted the employment of a nation's armed forces in support of foreign policies with relative impunity. Provided the commander on the spot had evaluated his instructions and his capabilities correctly, his success, should he achieve it, was seldom questioned, and his country was left free to enjoy the fruits of his efforts. History records the frequent use of naval squadrons, landing forces, and armed contingents which secured commercial, territorial, or other advantages by the simple expedient of having a decisive amount of employable force in a key spot at the right time. During these times, no employable amount of adverse political opposition from other states or princes could be brought to bear in time to affect the outcome of these incursions, and moral pressure was either nonexistent or impotent.

Because those conditions no longer exist, the historical treatment of shows of force in this paper has been arbitrarily separated into two time groupings, Early Times (Pre-World War II) and Modern Times (Post World War II) in order to indicate that, somewhere along the way, changing times, modern communications and world opinion have combined to cause nations inclined to employ force to consider carefully the fact that their actions would be

subject to world scrutiny, and perhaps interference. In other words, might does not make right, anymore.

EARLY TIMES

Tangier, 1803; and Algiers, 1815

At, and subsequent to American independence, seaborne commerce of all nations in the Mediterranean Sea was subject to constant attacks by pirate vessels of the Barbary States of Morocco, Algeria, Tripoli, and Tunis. The commerce of the infant United States was no exception, despite certain diplomatic negotiations which had been undertaken. That these efforts begat inconclusive results is not surprising, since they were conducted from a position of weakness, and for the most part consisted of endeavors to ransom captured seamen.

As a result of the depredations of the Barbary States, various United States efforts were made to bring the rulers of these states to heel. The efforts were only marginally successful, and generally seemed to depend on the amount of force which could be brought to bear in a given encounter. Two United States shows of forces, however, were successful, and bear recanting here.

A squadron of seven ships under command of Commodore Edward Preble was dispatched to the Mediterranean in 1803. On arrival at Gibraltar, Preble discovered that one of his ships had already captured a Moroccan cruiser, and caught him red-handed in company

with an American schooner taken as a prize. Since this Moroccan action constituted a breach of an earlier United States-Morocco treaty executed in 1786, Preble immediately set forth for Tangier with his force. He was able to secure from the then ruler of Morocco a disavowal of the action of the commander of the Moroccan cruiser, and a renewal of the provisions of the earlier treaty.¹

Several years later, in May of 1815, in a sequel to the Preble mission, a force of nine ships under command of Commodore Stephen Decatur, was dispatched to the Mediterranean. Encountering the flagship of the Dey of Algiers, whose ships had been pirating American ships and imprisoning their crews, Decatur disabled and captured the flagship and an accompanying vessel, capturing the Algerian admiral in the process. Decatur then proceeded, with his prizes and their crews, to Algiers. Here he presented the American grievances to the Dey, together with demands that no further depredations be conducted against American ships. The Dey, faced with Decatur's ships and guns, accepted the demands and concluded a treaty. This action ended the paying of tribute by United States merchant ships to the pirates of Algiers.²

Both the above examples typify the use of the show of force. In each case the power necessary to inflict severe punishment was

¹Allen Westcott and others, American Seapower since 1775, p. 43.

²Ibid., p. 92.

present and visible, and in each case credibility was promoted by the known fact that the power had only recently been exercised.³

Japan, 1846, 1853, and 1854

The actions of Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1853 and 1854 provide an example of the use of armed force in support of national policy, and in particular, in the conduct of a show of force. For some two hundred years, since the sixteenth century, Japan had been closed to Western traders, Western civilization, and Western warships. The settlement of the west coast of the United States, the advent of steam, and numerous United States shipping ventures in the Northern Pacific led to increased American government interest in opening Japan to United States influence and commerce. At this time, the only western presence in Japan consisted of an exclusive trading concession of the Dutch East India Company located in Nagasaki, and even this small activity was very closely controlled by the Japanese.

As a prelude to Perry's actions, the United States had sent a small two-ship squadron under Commodore Biddle into the Bay of Yedo, near Tokyo, in 1846. Pursuant to his instructions, Biddle inquired of local Japanese authorities whether they desired to make a treaty and open their ports to intercourse with ships of the United States. The Japanese declined in apparently very definite terms, and Biddle

³Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 179.

himself was roughed up by a Japanese soldier during his visit. Recognizing that any future negotiations would require a more impressive appearance of strength, the United States dispatched Commodore Perry to Japan in 1853.

Perry arrived in Yedo Bay with less force than had been intended, but he did have two modern steam warships, and decks cleared for action, on 8 July 1853. On this occasion he delivered his credentials, which included a letter from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and gave notice that he would return the following spring with a larger force. He then proceeded to the south, established a coaling base at Okinawa, and made a treaty with the ruler of that island. On his return to Yedo Bay on 31 March 1854, Perry found the Japanese disposed to a policy of conciliation. By his display of force, his interim actions which had become known to the Japanese, and his implied threats of more force to come, he secured from Japan a treaty of friendship and certain trading concessions.⁴

The willingness of the Japanese to be impressed by Perry's show of force may well have been improved by their knowledge that the United States had only recently fought and won a war with Mexico, and as a result of that war had annexed large portions of Mexican territory. In fact, Perry's orders would not have permitted him to employ force except in self-defense or in redressing

⁴Ibid., pp. 354-355.

violence against himself or one of his officers. His show of force was thus that and only that, but it was credible enough to the Japanese to lead them to acquiesce in his requests.

Cuba and the Maine, 1898

The prelude to the Spanish-American War was the sinking of the United States battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, in February, 1898. The Maine had been ordered to Key West, Florida, on the recommendation of the United States Consul General in Havana in order to be ready to provide support in Cuba, if required. The ship arrived in Key West on 15 December 1897, and on 24 January 1898 was ordered to proceed to Havana, arriving there on the 25th.⁵

The Maine's arrival in Havana was cloaked in the fiction of an ordinary ship visit to a foreign port. Her actual instructions, however, including a coded warning order directing her to be prepared for instant sailing from Key West for Havana were derived entirely from recommendations of the Consul General; and all concerned understood her mission to be a show of force to exert pressure on the Spanish government.⁶

The actual visit of the Maine in Havana proceeded uneventfully. Her commander conducted the usual rounds of maritime

⁵Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 95.

⁶Ibid., pp. 93-97.

courtesies, which were duly returned by Spanish officials. The ships officers and crew visited routinely ashore and without event. Spanish authorities in Cuba and in Spain continued their efforts to avoid hostilities, and the United States Secretary of the Navy, in early February, worried over the possibly incendiary nature of the Maine's continued presence in Havana, seemed desirous of recalling the ship.

The Consul General on the scene, however, hastened to advise that "ship or ships should be kept here all the time now. We should not relinquish position of peaceful control of situation."⁷ The Maine was not recalled, and on 15 February 1898 was blown up and sunk. The resulting public outcry in the United States, and the political repercussions of the sinking led directly to the outbreak of the war with Spain; a war which President McKinley did not seek,⁸ and which Spanish officials were indicating by every means at their disposal that they did not seek.

In tracing the events which led to the dispatch of the Maine to Havana and her subsequent loss, Millis had this to say:

Thus, at a time when the whole policy of Mr. McKinley and his administration was still officially directed toward peace, a machine of the most incendiary character had been prepared, ready to be sprung at a touch of a finger by a minor diplomatic official who had given ample evidence of a bellicose temperament.⁹

⁷Ibid., p. 97.

⁸Vagts, op. cit., p. 235.

⁹Millis, op. cit., p. 93.

Millis buttresses his assessment of the Consul General by numerous entries alleging inconsistent and unfactual reports tending to mislead and under-inform the administration in Washington.¹⁰ Whether the ultimate blame lies on the shoulders of the Consul General or not, the responsibility remains in Washington. The attitude of Millis toward the Consul General becomes understandable when it is remembered that the individual concerned was one Fitzhugh Lee. Lee had been a distinguished Confederate general of cavalry during the Civil War. He was appointed Consul General at Havana by President Cleveland in 1896, after having served as Governor of the State of Virginia from 1886 to 1890. After the outbreak of the Spanish-American War he returned to the Army, one of three ex-Confederate major generals so to serve, and filled assignments as military governor of Havana and Pinar del Rio. He retired as a brigadier general in 1901 and died in Washington, D.C., in 1905.¹¹

The circumstances under which the Maine was ordered to Havana were certainly explosive. The Cubans were in revolt against Spain, and the leaders of the revolt were determined to gain independence. Public opinion and powerful segments of United States political power internally were in favor of United States intervention, either to free the Cubans or to annex the island. In this setting,

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 93-99.

¹¹"Fitzhugh Lee," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 13, p. 861.

the use of a show of force could have been, and was initially, beneficial. The consequences of the ship's employment however were not sufficiently evaluated, the political purposes not adequately understood, and the ship's commander did not have a clear-cut mission nor detailed instructions. The ship's destruction led to a war not desired by responsible officials of either potential belligerent, and more important, removed initiative and control of the situation from the hands of the President of the United States.¹²

Siberia, 1919-1920

Following the Russian revolution of 1917, Russian participation in the World War I struggles against Germany came largely to a standstill. France and Great Britain were fearful that large amounts of military materiel in Russia might fall into German hands. To forestall this, they proposed the dispatch of Allied expeditions to European and Siberian Russia. President Woodrow Wilson favored neither of these efforts, because, to him, they represented intervention in the Russian revolution. However, he foresaw that Japanese participation in the Siberian segment of the proposed expeditions would act to give Japan a free hand to exploit the Russian collapse there with the result that Japan's already significant position toward China would be strengthened. Although

¹²Vagts, op. cit., p. 236.

not optimistic as to the success of American participation insofar as countering the Japanese influence was concerned, he nevertheless proposed a Japanese-American expedition of a few thousand troops in the hope that United States participation would act to keep Japanese efforts at a minimum level.

As he had feared, he was unsuccessful, the Japanese force numbering some seventy-two thousand troops, while the American force was only nine thousand. To make matters worse, the Japanese declined to depart in 1920 when the American force was withdrawn.¹³

President Wilson's attempted show of force here failed, and it is doubtful that he had much hope for success from the outset. He knew, and the Japanese knew, that he could not make his show of force credible. The United States hoped therefore, that the presence of American troops in Siberia would lead the Japanese to desist from seeking to extend their influence on the mainland of Asia was not fulfilled. The President however had feared this reaction from the Japanese, and had acted in such a manner that he was able to end the matter simply by withdrawing his troops. His show of force was unsuccessful, but he had foreseen the consequences of failure, and acted accordingly without undue effect.

¹³Doris A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy, p. 186.

Columbia and Panama, 1903

In 1902, after extensive debate over the most desirable location for a canal joining the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, United States authorities decided on the route through the Isthmus of Panama, and negotiated a treaty with the Republic of Columbia for the necessary construction rights. The treaty was signed on 22 January 1903, but the Senate of Columbia voted against its ratification. This action acted to undo extensive negotiations involving several participants. A French company which had gone bankrupt attempting to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama had residual interests in the area going back to 1881. Columbia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua were all interested in the final location of the canal; and political interests in the United States were active in pressing the cause of one or another of the interested parties. President Theodore Roosevelt, while exceedingly put out at the action of the Columbian Senate in failing to ratify the treaty, was reluctant to intervene forcibly to assure access to the Isthmian canal route.

One of the President's advisors pressed for United States action under an 1846 treaty with Columbia which permitted United States intervention to protect the canal route against interruption of transit caused by domestic disturbances.¹⁴ This advisor was proposing an exceedingly loose interpretation of language,

¹⁴Bemis, op. cit., p. 514.

as evidenced by certain words in his proposal: "Once on the ground and duly installed, this government would find no difficulty in meeting questions as they arose."¹⁵ The President was not swayed by these arguments, and took no immediate action of a decisive nature, although there is evidence that he seriously considered such actions.¹⁶

The former owners of the canal site, the French Canal Company, operating through employees of the Panama Railroad Company, a subsidiary of the old canal company, proceeded to organize a revolution in Panama. No evidence exists that high United States officials conspired directly with the plotters of this revolution, but there is also no evidence that they actively opposed a movement which had presented itself for their convenience. President Roosevelt became aware of the imminence of the revolution, and directed the Navy to hold warships within striking distance of the Panama transit, on both Atlantic and Pacific sides. On 2 November 1903, orders were sent to the commanders of the ships concerned to proceed to Panama and to maintain a free and uninterrupted transit, even to the extent of using armed force to occupy the route, and to prevent the landing of Columbian troops.¹⁷

When the revolution occurred on 3 November 1903, the USS Nashville was on hand at Panama City, and the USS Dixie with a

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 515.

contingent of Marines aboard arrived shortly thereafter.¹⁸ The Columbian Government did not land troops against the Panamanian rebels at Panama City. Being thus uninterfered with by its parent government, the rebel Panamanian Government proceeded to proclaim its independence from Columbia, and was recognized by the United States on 6 November 1903. On 18 November 1903 the United States and the new government of Panama signed a treaty which conferred on the United States the rights to build the Panama Canal, fortify it, and to possess the canal zone, ten miles wide from Colon to Panama City, as if it were sovereign territory.¹⁹

President Roosevelt was later to acknowledge the attitude of the United States in this affair in a speech at the University of California on 11 March 1911 by his statement that: "I took the Canal Zone."²⁰

MODERN TIMES

Czechoslovakia, 1947-1948

The end of World War II raised extensive questions as to the future, boundaries, and status of certain nations of Europe. One of those most doubtful as to status and alignment was Czechoslovakia. The armies of Russia occupied all the country except a small

¹⁸Allen Westcott and others, op. cit., p. 298.

¹⁹Bemis, op. cit., p. 515.

²⁰Ibid., p. 517.

segment at the extreme western end of the nation at the war's end. As was the case with several other countries which had been victimized by Nazi Germany, Czechoslovak governments in exile had existed during the war in both London and Moscow. With the end of the war both groups vied for control of the country. However, following a period of some turmoil, a new and hopefully representative Czech government was established in Prague in October 1945.

In the first elections held after the war, in 1946, the Communist Party polled thirty-seven percent of the vote, becoming the single most important party.²¹ Subsequent events made it apparent that the Czech leaders' hopes for coexistence with the Soviet Union on a political basis would not be tolerated by the Soviets, and that as a result of this friction the people of Czechoslovakia would repudiate the Communist Party at the elections scheduled for 1948. This feeling had been sharpened by Russian actions in forcing the Czechs to decline United States aid which was offered under the Marshall Plan.²²

In early February 1948 a crisis was precipitated in the Czech government when the Communist Minister of Interior refused an order of the Cabinet as a whole to dismiss certain Communist police officials.²³ During this crisis, the Soviet press and

²¹Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved, pp. 41-46.

²²Ibid., pp. 51-62.

²³Kurt Glaser, Czechoslovakia: A Critical History, p. 151.

radio proclaimed the necessity to liquidate the anti-Soviet agents of domestic and foreign reaction in Czechoslovakia; new Soviet units were reportedly introduced into neighboring Austria and garrisoned not far from the Czech border; and the Hungarian, Rumanian, and Yugoslav Communist Parties all contributed with rumors that a Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia would occur before the end of the month.²⁴ The pressures exerted by the Soviet Government, in concert with that of Communist members of the Czech Government were sufficient to convince President Benes of Czechoslovakia that he could not prevail, and he capitulated when faced with the Communist show of force.²⁵

Opinion exists that decisive action by the Czech Government at the time of the Communist takeover might well have defeated it.²⁶ There is little doubt that the Soviet political pressures, combined with the knowledge that Russian military forces were waiting in the wings contributed significantly to Czech delay and indecision, and thus defeat. To the Czechs the Russian threat was credible. They had only recently seen the departure of Russian troops from their soil, and new troop units had just been stationed in neighboring Austria. The Czechs had already been subjected to the indignity of having to acquiesce in Russian annexation of

²⁴Ripka, op. cit., pp. 306-307.

²⁵Glaser, op. cit., p. 152.

²⁶Ibid., p. 149

their eastern province of Ruthenia,²⁷ and they had no assurance of help from any quarter.

For the Soviets, this was a virtually riskless show of force, undertaken for prime political purposes against a victim easily convinced that he had no choice but capitulation.

Lebanon, 1958

On 15 July 1958, United States troops landed in Lebanon at the requests of the President of that country. For some months, the government of Lebanon had been apprehensive of efforts to cause its overthrow, and on 6 June, through its Foreign Minister, had lodged an official complaint of interference in its internal affairs on the part of the United Arab Republic, with the United Nations Security Council.²⁸ On 11 June the Security Council had approved the dispatch of an observer group to Lebanon to insure that no illegal infiltration of personnel or arms across the borders of Lebanon occurred. At this time, armed forces of the United Arab Republic were positioned in strength on the Syrian-Lebanese border, and rebel bands, supported from outside Lebanon, were operating in various parts of the country. The dispatch of the United Nations observer group did not cause the anti-government activities to cease, but did serve the useful purpose of having

²⁷Ibid., p. 88.

²⁸Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 88, Oct. 1962, p. 68.

constituted a preliminary action to support an allied intervention at government request, should that action be later necessary.

Sizeable segments of Lebanese territory were in rebel hands by the end of June.²⁹

United States Sixth Fleet elements had been positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean by the end of May and Secretary of State Dulles had announced that the integrity and independence of Middle East countries were vital to world peace and the national interest of the United States. The Soviet Union had likewise been following events closely, and had charged on 1 May that preparations were being made to land American Marines in Lebanon. On 15 May, following a visit by President Nasser of Egypt to Russia, Premier Khrushchev issued a statement in support of Nasser in the Middle East, and promised Russian help if required.³⁰

On 14 July, the government of Iraq was overthrown, and the revolutionary new government announced its form would be an Iraqi republic whose purposes would include the maintenance of friendly ties with other Arab nations. President Chamoun of Lebanon asked President Eisenhower to station United States forces in Lebanon without delay,³¹ as the only way to enable his government to survive. United States Marines commenced landing in Beirut on 15 July 1958, and the United States Army followed, commencing

²⁹Ibid., p. 69.

³⁰Edgar N. Glotzbach, op. cit., p. 27.

³¹McClintock, op. cit., p. 69.

19 July. By 21 July Lebanese authorities reported the situation improved considerably; and the flow of money, arms, and people across the borders had reduced. Reports of the United Nations observer group supported this conclusion. The country became increasingly more stable, presidential elections were held as scheduled on 31 July, and the new President assumed office on 23 September. By 15 October the situation had stabilized, and Lebanese and United States officials agreed that the presence of United States troops was no longer required. The last of the troops left Lebanon on 25 October 1958.³²

The circumstances under which this operation was conducted were intricate. United States forces could have been opposed by Lebanese troops, United Arab Republic troops, or Russian "volunteers." They were opposed by none; and Lebanese troops operated with those of the United States in patrol activities and in training exercises. Extensive diplomatic maneuvers were carried out throughout the period of United States presence in Lebanon, and involved the United States, Russia, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, and the United Nations. While there is no incontrovertible proof that the United States action led directly to the cessation of efforts against the Lebanese Government, the fact remains that the United States and Lebanese aims for insuring the stability of a friendly government were achieved, and without bloodshed.

³²McClintock, op. cit., p. 65.

The Lebanese operation has to be counted a successful show of force. The speed, timing, and scope of United States actions served to indicate that words spoken meant what they said. The United States would support the government of Lebanon. The acceptance of United States troops by Lebanese troops probably contributed to the level of credibility, and of even greater credibility was the demonstrated willingness of the United States to introduce its forces into a situation, the consequences of which could have been exceedingly serious. This step must have convinced those responsible for the externally supported actions against Lebanon that the United States was prepared to render the support to Lebanon which it had promised.

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

Following the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship in Cuba by the revolutionary forces led by Fidel Castro, the new government moved ever closer to the Soviet Union. In December 1961, Castro finally came out into the open with his statement that he was a Marxist-Leninist and would remain a Marxist-Leninist until he died. The United States policy toward the Castro government, after having perceived Cuba's Communist leanings, was to isolate that government by political and economic measures. In January 1962, the Organization of American States officially supported the United States policy by a resolution which declared that adherence by any member of the Organization to Marxist-Leninism was incompatible with the

principles and objectives of the inter-American system; that the Castro government had identified itself as Marxist-Leninist and should be excluded from the inter-American system; and that measures to implement the resolution should be taken without delay. President Kennedy declared an embargo on trade with Cuba effective 7 February 1962.³³

Cuba continued her movement toward the Russians, and by the summer of 1962 there was evidence of a substantial military buildup in Cuba. The nature of the buildup was initially thought to be defensive in nature. On 4 September 1962, President Kennedy issued a warning pointed toward the arms buildup, and stated that United States policy was that the Castro regime would not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force; that it would be prevented from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere; and that the presence in Cuba of offensive ground-to-ground missiles or other significant offensive weapons systems would be considered the gravest of issues. He issued a similar warning on 13 September, and the United States Congress adopted a resolution of similar content to the President's warnings on 25 September.

Suspecting that offensive weapons were in fact being introduced into Cuba, the United States conducted a reconnaissance by aircraft on 14 October. Positive evidence of the presence of

³³Glotzbach, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

offensive missile systems presence in Cuba resulted, including the fact that sites for them were under construction.

On 22 October, President Kennedy placed the missile crisis before the world in a radio and television address. He announced initial steps being taken by the United States, including a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment being shipped to Cuba, close surveillance of the island, reinforcement of the United States Naval Base at Quantanamo and evacuation of dependents therefrom, and action to place the entire matter before the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The latter organization passed a resolution the following day supporting the United States. On 24 October the quarantine announced earlier was instituted. Additional preparatory measures were taken by the United States, including the ordering to active duty of certain reservists, extensions of enlistments, alerting United States armed forces on a worldwide basis, and the massing of ships, aircraft, and troop units in South Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports of the United States.

Extensive exchanges of diplomatic messages involving the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States took place. The United States declined to delay or cancel its orders for the quarantine of shipping, but no Russian ships entered the area of the quarantine during the period of tension. One non-Russian ship was stopped, inspected, and allowed to proceed toward Cuba. Actual Russian

ships enroute toward Cuba were either diverted or delayed, and an actual confrontation between American quarantine enforcing ships and Russian flag vessels avoided.

On 28 October, Chairman Krushchev informed President Kennedy that he had issued instructions that construction of the missile sites in Cuba be discontinued, and the weapons themselves crated and returned to the Soviet Union. The actual dismantling of the sites was verified on 1 November by aerial reconnaissance, and the Cuban missile crisis was history.³⁴

There can be little doubt that the show of force actions taken by the United States in this crisis caused Krushchev to withdraw his missiles from Cuba. He had been provided two clear warnings by the President, and another by the Congress, with respect to the offensive systems being placed in Cuba. He did not change course however until United States preparations for war were made extensive enough and apparent enough to convince him that the intentions stated earlier were valid. Then, and only then, did he retreat.

RECAPITULATION

The foregoing historical treatment of shows of force indicates that of the eight considered, six were successful, and two were unsuccessful. In the two unsuccessful instances, the basic cause for failure was the absence of a credible amount of force in one

³⁴Ibid., pp. 35-43.

case (President Wilson's dispatch of troops to Siberia in 1919) and the absence of a clear political purpose in the other (the employment of the Maine in Havana in 1898).

The political purpose of the actions undertaken was basic and clear in all six of the successful efforts, and was present and recognized in one of the two unsuccessful cases. The credibility of the forces employed in all six of the successful efforts was established by their presence, and their adequacy in relationship to potentially hostile forces which might be brought to bear against them, and recent national history of a bellicose nature of the nation conducting the show of force.

These two considerations, political purpose and credibility, are deemed a necessary element to any successful conduct of a show of force, and are discussed further in the succeeding chapter, together with certain other considerations not necessarily always requisite to success.

CHAPTER 4

REQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL SHOW OF FORCE

The examples employed in the preceding chapter of historical shows of force indicate two basic conditions for a successful employment of the technique to be a political purpose or objective for the operation, and credibility for the show of force action undertaken. These two considerations will be further examined in this chapter, with further treatment of some additional considerations not necessarily a positive requirement in the past, but which have either been pertinent to some past situations, or appear more likely to be important in the future than perhaps they were in the past. These considerations are timing, a recognition of the possibility of failure and the consequences thereof, the impact or acceptability of a show of force before world opinion, and the requirement for close coordination of military and political activities in the conduct of show of force actions.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

No approved doctrine covering the conduct of shows of force was discovered by this writer, but a limited distribution document issued for instructional purposes at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, does address a closely related matter entitled "Military Expeditions Short of War." Among other things, this publication states that such expeditions are undertaken "in

conjunction with diplomatic action," and that the decision to employ military force in such an expedition is inherently political.¹ As earlier stated, this publication does not specifically address shows of force, but it does appear to address matters which approach parallelism with the definition set forth in Chapter 1. Referral to the successful examples cited in the preceding chapter indicate a political reason (and reasoning) for each of them. In the case of the expeditions against the piratical rulers of Tangier and Algiers, the reason was the diplomatic one of security of commerce on the high seas; in the instance of the use of the Navy to deter the landing of Columbian troops to quell the rebels of the (then) Columbian state of Panama, the political purpose was to secure the route of the Panama Canal; and in the case of the Lebanon operation, the purpose was to inhibit externally supported efforts to overthrow a friendly government. The examples set forth lead to a conclusion that shows of force are conducted for the primary purpose of achieving political or diplomatic ends.

CREDIBILITY

In order for a show of force to be effective, the actions which constitute it must be capable of being believed. If any

¹US Marine Corps Educational Center, Marine Corps Schools (MCS) Publication 3-1, Military Expeditions Short of War, pp. 2-4.
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circumstance leads the intended object of the show of force to disbelieve that the initiator of the action will not or cannot employ the force in question successfully, the intended show of force lacks credibility and cannot be successful.

Numerous conditions can affect the credibility of an intended show of force, but a primary one would have to be the adequate and properly positioned force, in relation to whatever force assets the intended victim can bring to bear. Given this, the adversary must be convinced that the intent and the will to employ the force portrayed is present. These two conditions are the backbone of credibility, although others such as timing and surprise may also be pertinent.

Several of the earlier examples can be used to illustrate credibility. President Theodore Roosevelt's actions in deterring Columbia's expected opposition to the Panamanian revolution in 1903 was certainly credible to the Columbians. The United States' desire for acquisition of Isthmian real estate through which to construct the Panama Canal was well-known; United States naval units were known to be in the area; and no one knew better than the Columbians the limitations of their own forces in seeking to counter those of the United States. When United States ships arrived on the scene, followed a few days later by official United States recognition of the new Panamanian Government and a United States declaration of intent to protect that government, no practical choice was left to the Columbians. The United States show of

force was adequate, credible, and successful, and the political objective of access to Panamanian real estate was a reality.

In the Lebanon action of 1958, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic was well aware that the United States had indicated an intention to aid the government of Lebanon. He did not, however, take any steps to reduce the pressures on Lebanon until he was actually presented with evidence of that intent. Perhaps it may be assumed that the United States intent to provide assistance to Lebanon was not yet credible to him.

Nasser may have been surprised at the speed of the United States response to the request of Lebanon's President Chamoun for assistance of 14 July. He undoubtedly knew that Sixth Fleet amphibious forces were in the Mediterranean; they habitually were. He may have been misled by newspaper accounts that the Sixth Fleet was largely deployed along the coast of Spain at the time.² There is reason also to accept the belief that Nasser may not have been aware that there were three United States amphibious squadrons in the Mediterranean at the time, rather than the usual one; and further, that he was unaware of the speed with which United States Army elements could be placed in Lebanon. In any event, 2000 Marines landed at Beirut the day following the Lebanese request. A similar force landed the next day, and two days later another such force arrived by sea, plus additional Marines by air from

²McClintock, op. cit., p. 69.

the United States. The following day an Army battle group arrived, and by D-Day plus 12 over 14,000 United States troops (6,000 Marines and 8,000 soldiers, including a battalion of 72 tanks) were on the scene.³ An impressive force, adequate to provide the assistance which had been requested, had been placed in Lebanon in a very short time, and it had both air and naval support; and probably equally important from a credibility point of view, the intent and will of the United States had been convincingly demonstrated by the very fact of the troop deployment.

There is no incontrovertible proof that the United States actions in Lebanon caused the cessation of both the rebellion against the Lebanese Government and of the external support to that rebellion. The facts are, however, that both did stop. At least one responsible observer, the United States Ambassador to Lebanon at the time stated that without the ". . . presence of American forces in Lebanon, the crisis would have continued, and the constructive elements in the country, which ultimately were able to carry out presidential elections and to find a solution to the crisis, could not have achieved their purpose."⁴

Both basic ingredients to credibility were demonstrated in the Lebanon operation. The force involved was adequate and present,

³S. S. Wade, "Operation Bluebat," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 43, Jul. 1959, p. 10.

⁴McClintock, op. cit., p. 65.

and the intent and will to employ it had been made believable by the speed, scope, and decisiveness with which it had been deployed.

One last aspect of credibility bears mention; in modern times probably more than mention. Starting from the basic premise that the primary purpose of any show of force operation is political in nature, it follows that the nature of such an operation has to be consistent with national character. This being the case, the behavior of the nation initiating the action and its actions in the time period just preceding a period of tension would serve as a valid indication of its resolution and intent with respect to a show of force. Thus, a nation which has established a pattern of aggressive actions in its foreign policies is much more apt to be believed should it undertake a show of force than one whose behavior has bordered on the timid. The converse of the foregoing is also true; and is especially so if the nation seeking to exploit a show of force situation does so from an immediate history of retreating from situations in which force could have been employed.

TIMING

With respect to the aspect of timing mentioned briefly at the beginning of this chapter, there would appear to be some instances in which it would be relatively unimportant. That is, in a situation in which the objective state were powerless to oppose the intervening power, and lacked the means of acquiring reinforcement or help, timing would not be too crucial. In the historical

examples related earlier, timing was important in some; academic in others. Specifically, there was no reason for haste in Commodores Preble's and Decatur's actions against the Barbary States in 1803 and 1815, respectively. Their actions could have been conducted either earlier or later than they actually were without undue effect one way or the other. The same could be said for Commodore Perry's conduct in opening Japan to intercourse with the United States. It will be remembered that Perry initially arrived in Japan in July 1853, delivered his messages for transmission to the Emperor, and stated he would return the next spring with a larger force. On his return the following March, he was successful in negotiating a treaty which met the United States objectives. While there may have been some applied psychology in Perry's method of operation, there is no indication that any precise degree of timing was implicit to his success.

In more recent examples timing assumes more importance. Even a weak state can marshal world opinion and perhaps outside assistance if given time. Even as far back as the United States intimidation of Columbia, timing was important in that United States actions and recognition of the new Panamanian government required accomplishment before powerless Columbia could garner support.

On the theory that it is easier to extinguish a small fire than a large one,⁵ it can be expected that timing may be a more

⁵Vagts, op. cit., p. 258.

important consideration in future shows of force than it has tended to be in the distant past. It was obviously crucial to the Cuban missile crisis, since United States actions had to succeed before the Soviet missiles became operational. It was also critical in the Lebanon situation, lest the Iraq example of overthrow of the government next door, which occurred on 14 July 1958, be repeated in Lebanon before corrective measures could be undertaken. In this connection, the then J3, American Land Forces, said that "the timing was so delicate that a landing 48 hours 'before' would have been too soon, and a landing 24 hours 'after' would have been too late."⁶

FAILURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Any nation employing its armed forces in pursuit of its objectives runs the risk of embroiling those forces, and itself, in hostilities. This is certainly true of shows of force. Should the adversary choose to resist rather than be intimidated, the choice must then be made by the initiator whether to continue to press the matter to possible hostilities, or to desist and accept the consequences of having failed. In effect, by resisting, the intended victim has undertaken a show of force of his own.

⁶Lynn D. Smith, "Lebanon--Professionalism at Its Best," Military Review, Vol. 39, Jun. 1959, p. 40.

President Woodrow Wilson undertook a show of force in 1919 by introducing American forces into Siberia in an effort to dilute Japanese influence, and (hopefully) to induce the Japanese to withdraw when American forces did. The President did not expect his ploy to work, and when it did not he merely departed with no further action. He had foreseen the possibility of failure, and when it occurred, he withdrew without further United States involvement.

The introduction of the USS Maine into the Cuban revolutionary situation in 1898 was different. The presence of the ship was intended to impress Spanish officials and provide a means to evacuate American nationals if necessary. This mission was initially successful, but the Maine was left in Havana unnecessarily long after this success. When the ship was destroyed at her mooring, the public outcry was such that the issue of war or peace was removed from the President's hands, and the Spanish-American War resulted.

It is apparent that the possible consequences of the dispatch of the Maine to Havana were not adequately considered in advance of the action. Quite apart from the immediate effects, the Spanish-American War, the more lasting effects have not departed even now, for the War led to United States acquisition of the Philippines,⁷ and the projection of the United States in the affairs of the far

⁷Bemis, op. cit., p. 471.

Pacific. Whether this would have occurred in any event is academic; the Spanish-American War placed the United States there, and there she remains today.

Possible consequences of other shows of force are interesting to contemplate, had these actions not succeeded, and lead one to wonder whether the possible effects were completely pondered before action was undertaken. Lebanon, for example, poses interesting questions; and assuming some early United States activities in South Vietnam to have been shows of force at the time, that area may be said to provide some interesting answers as to possible consequences of unsuccessful shows of force.

It would appear that consideration of possible consequences of show of force actions must occur during the deliberations which precede their undertaking. It further appears that these are basically political questions, tempered by military advice as to capabilities and possible military consequences.

ACCEPTABILITY OF ACTIONS BEFORE WORLD OPINION

In early times this aspect of shows of force did not particularly apply. The use of force in international relations was more or less an accepted fact of life, and in any event, the status of communications was such that the matter was ended more often than not, before it became generally known. In the case of peoples who had become accustomed to military pressures throughout history, the actual application of military power, rather than

just the threat of it, was not unexpected. A holdover feeling to this is reflected in an observation made by Ambassador McClintock after the Lebanon action in 1958: "The Lebanese, throughout the 19th century and later, had become used to armed intervention by foreign powers, and to naval bombardment as a means of conducting foreign policy. Some Lebanese could not see why the Americans had bothered to land at Beirut if they did not use their firepower against the rebels."⁸

The use of force in international relations is not now condoned, either nationally or internationally, and rapid worldwide communications and press networks immediately focus world attention on hostilities or the threat of them. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy took immediate steps to inform both the public and international organizations of actions taken and contemplated, together with the reasons for them in both the Lebanon and Cuban missile crises.

It can be expected that any future shows of force by the United States will be subject to the same conditions, as above outlined, and must therefore be designed to meet at least some degree of world approval. This can only add to the political importance of these operations as compared to the military.

⁸McClintock, op. cit., p. 75.

COORDINATION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Coordination is probably one of the most overworked words in military terminology. The cited "lessons learned" in almost every exercise or operation include terms like poor coordination, improper liaison, and incompatible signal and fire control systems. Since the purely military people and units have not yet learned coordination as well as they should, even after years of dealing only in terms and systems most military people understand, it is reasonable to expect a requirement for close coordination in situations in which strangers support each other.

Even in historical examples cited earlier, coordination was recognized as important, although the actual mechanics may have amounted to little more than insuring that the mission given people such as Commodores Decatur, Biddle, and Perry on their departure was consistent with the national aims which their actions were to support. The instructions and pre-mission coordination provided Commodore Perry, in which Perry himself assisted in the drafting of his own instructions, typify the nature of the coordination employed.⁹

Under current conditions, coordination assumes greater importance because the means to practice it are prevalent and efficient, and the close relationship between crises which exist even though the areas of crises may be separated by thousands of miles. The

⁹Bemis, op. cit., p. 355.

Cuban missile crisis, in which the bridge of the USS Pierce, the destroyer which intercepted and inspected the only Cuba-bound ship which was stopped during that emergency, was in direct voice contact with the White House during the actual interception,¹⁰ provides an example of close "coordination."

On the other hand, close coordination during the early stages of the Lebanon action was surprisingly deficient. The American Ambassador knew the landing would occur, and when,¹¹ but had no direct communication with the amphibious task force which would execute it, nor with the landing force commander ashore after the landing had been made.¹² This situation was quickly remedied after the landing, and both communications and liaison were established. The absence of such a mechanism at the outset however is surprising, even perhaps astonishing, and calls to mind a British quotation once used in treating the subject of surprise in military operations: "Gentlemen, I submit that it is one thing to surprise your enemy, but it is entirely another to astonish him."¹³

The requirement for coordination between military and political echelons at all appropriate levels, from decision through planning to execution, is a critical requirement, and is emphasized

¹⁰J. W. Foust, then Commanding Officer, USS Pierce, Personal interview, 1965.

¹¹McClintock, op. cit., p. 69.

¹²H. A. Hadd, "Orders Firm but Flexible," US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 88, Oct. 1962, p. 84.

¹³Douglas Drysdale, Lecture on "Organization and Employment of the British Infantry Division," Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., Oct. 1953.

by the political primacy of the show of force. The requirement for close coordination carries with it the parallel requirements for adequate communications throughout, and for close understanding of all participants of the importance of the political nature of the entire undertaking.

CHAPTER 5

PLANNED USAGE OF SHOWS OF FORCE

In preceding chapters several past shows of force have been reviewed, and certain circumstances or conditions common to them have emerged as essential to success, or, if absent or deficient, contributory to failure. This chapter seeks to measure certain planned future shows of force as extracted from a sampling of actual operation plans in relation to the circumstances derived to determine the adequacy of future planned usage of the show of force as reflected in the plans included in the sampling used.

This writer has not had access to all existing contingency plans, but has examined nineteen unified command level plans. The sampling of plans included products from the Atlantic, European, Pacific, Southern, and Strike Commands, and thus represents coverage of all geographical areas except the Alaskan Command. Not all the plans examined call for possible conduct of show of force operations, as is to be expected, but seven of the nineteen do, and the coverage of these seven includes at least one plan from all the commands listed above except the Strike Command. For purposes of this paper, the geographical coverage of the sampling used is believed broad enough to constitute an adequate cross section.

In evaluating the seven plans in which a show of force is envisioned, the conditions derived in Chapter 4 (political objective,

credibility, timing, recognition of the consequences of failure, effects of world opinion, and provision for political-military coordination) were applied to each of the plans. The results of this application are set forth below.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVE

In each plan it was apparent that the political objective of the potential operation was recognized. In two instances this was clearly stated, with extensive discussion, and in others it was only inferred, but there was no doubt in any instance. The weakness of even a strong inference however lies in the circumstance that a unified command level plan provides guidance to subordinate echelons, which must prepare supporting plans, and whose people will be the actual executors of the plan should execution ever be directed. From this aspect, it would appear that regardless of the strength of the inference in those cases where that was the case, the plan lacks strength insofar as subordinate echelons of the command are concerned. This could be supplied in various ways; by a show of force annex (none of the plans contains one), by treatment in the intelligence annex, or in the general situation, to name a few. But in any event, the political nature and primacy of the show of force action should be clearly set forth to highlight this important facet of the action.

CREDIBILITY

The indications or bases of credibility developed in Chapter 4 were used to seek to determine whether credibility of the plans examined was reasonably adequate. The indications are:

- a. Is the amount and balance of the forces contemplated adequate?
- b. Is the intent and will to employ the force believable?
- c. Does timing or surprise have a bearing?
- d. Would recent United States actions or conduct bear on credibility?

In five of the seven cases, the amount of force called for in the plan appeared clearly adequate; in one case it appeared doubtful and in one undetermined. In the last two cases however, the inadequacy or doubt appeared to be more a function of passage of time since the plan was written than a lack of appreciation of requirements.

In six of the seven plans, the will and intent of the United States to employ force if required appeared believable. In the remaining case, the doubt was caused by reason of the fact that a recent set of circumstances paralleling those of the plan concerned occurred without a United States response. This fact could well act sufficiently in a future similar situation to a degree sufficient to render a United States intent to employ the forces as not believable.

In order for timing or surprise to be measured against the plans it would be necessary that the plans set forth a degree of specificity with respect to actual circumstances in the area in which operations would be envisioned which is simply not realistic, that is, an actual political and military situation would have to be included in the plan in sufficient detail to permit an estimate of the effects of timing and surprise to be made. In no instance do the plans contain this degree of detail, and it is doubtful that they could be so prepared, except in event of an actual situation which itself would act to provide the details required. For purposes of this comparison, therefore, the issues of timing and surprise are not considered pertinent.

Recent United States actions are deemed entirely adequate to support a belief on the part of the potential adversaries of six of the seven plans considered that the forces involved in the plans would in fact be employed, if necessary. The only exception would be in the same plan addressed above under United States will and intent, and for the same reason, a recent declination to act in a situation similar to that outlined in the plan concerned. Even in this plan, establishment of credibility would probably be feasible were the plan to be executed, primarily due to the recent and continuing demonstrated willingness of the United States to employ its armed forces wherever its interests are involved. On an overall basis, it is believed that the plans sampled adequately support the requisite levels of credibility.

RECOGNITION OF FAILURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Application of this condition to the plans sampled is difficult, due primarily to the overall light treatment of political matters and primacy in most of the plans. As stated earlier, the possibility of failure of a contemplated show of force is basically one of the political aspects which require consideration at the time a decision to conduct a show of force is being considered and made. Since the political considerations cannot be known in detail in advance, evaluation of this condition with much assurance is not feasible.

Some measure of treatment may be inferred from the fact that in most plans in which a show of force is called for, the show of force is one of a series of escalating actions which military planners consider might be required. An inference can be drawn from this that recognition of failure and its consequences has been made, when in fact such is not the case; the plans are contingency plans drawn to fit a variety of possible situations, not a single escalating situation in which all possible ramifications, particularly political ones, have been considered. Since political consequences can only be assessed at the time a decision to conduct an actual show of force is made, an adequate finding with respect to this consideration in the plans sampled is not believed possible.

RECOGNITION OF THE EFFECTS OF WORLD OPINION

Recognition of this matter was apparent in significant degree in each of the seven plans examined. All make provision for public information coverage, and contain either annexes or other instructions for guidance of subordinates. This unanimity contributed significantly to the inference of political awareness with respect to the political objective coverage discussed earlier.

It should be recognized however that this coverage, as contained in the individual plans, is slanted, and properly so, toward the military side of the information picture. The more significant aspect of providing for such coverage at the higher political level is absent. This is no defect in the plans themselves, as such, as these matters are properly the purview of the political echelons of the government.

The plans are believed adequate from this point of view, insofar as the military aspects of world opinion are concerned. Again, from the point of view of overall adequacy insofar as world opinion is concerned, the inclusion in the overall plans of political guidance would seem to meet this requirement, and is indeed a portion of that need.

PROVISION FOR MILITARY-POLITICAL COORDINATION

Allusion has been made throughout this paper to the need for close coordination of military and political effort in show of

force actions. Each of the seven contingency plans calling for show of force operations reflects consideration of political matters, but for the most part this consideration tends to be inferential rather than directive, and definitive provision for coordination is generally lacking.

For example, the communications annex of only two of the seven plans sampled provided for direct communications with the American Embassy in the country concerned and the task force charged with executing the operation. In the two annexes which did so provide, one merely portrayed the embassy in the local radio circuit at time of execution but without frequency information or call signs. Establishment of liaison with the Embassy was directed in only five of the seven plans.

The absence, in the main, of formal direction for establishment of a mechanism by which coordination between military and political officials during planning and execution could be partially compensated for by emphasis on the political importance of the show of force action. However, this emphasis appears in only four of the seven plans sampled, and in only two of them is it done in adequate measure. In view of the prime importance to successful conduct of shows of force of political matters, the weakness in provision for coordination of effort is a serious one.

RECAPITULATION

The overall comparisons of the seven plans sampled with the conditions history indicates contribute to successful shows of force reveal that the plans are generally adequate with respect to the basic conditions of a political objective and to credibility, but they are not adequate in the area of emphasis on the importance of the political situation to the operation and that they are inadequate with respect to insuring coordination between military and political authorities during planning and execution.

It may be said that the weakness in the area of definite guidance on political matters, and the serious defects in provision for coordination are academic under current conditions; that future shows of force will be marked by more than adequate political guidance and coordination at every step. Recent shows of force, the Cuban missile crisis in particular, give weight to this point, but do not alter the fact that every practical degree of guidance which can be foreseen should be included in contingency plans.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

United States history since the end of World War II reflects clearly the role played by the nation's armed forces in support of the conduct of foreign policy. This history, and the policy statements of the current Commander-in-Chief leave no doubt that the armed forces will be continued in this role.


Whether the use of the armed forces takes the direction of actual hostilities or in lesser actions such as shows of force, will depend on the decision-making levels of the government. The fact that armed forces are expected to be capable of executing shows of force when called upon is substantiated by the existence of numerous unified command level contingency operation plans which call for just such actions.

CONCLUSIONS

The armed forces can be expected to perform shows of force in future support of United States foreign policies. In order that these may be conducted effectively, current contingency plans require strengthening in the areas of provision of political guidance to executing military echelons, and the inclusion of explicit mechanism to insure adequate coordination of military and political effort during planning and execution of shows of force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Instructions to commanders of unified commands should include a requirement that political information be expanded in contingency plans requiring the conduct of shows of force, and definitive provision be made for close military and political coordination during planning and execution of such operations.


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